uefi/linaro-edk2/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec - device/linaro/hikey960 - Gitiles

 ## @file  SecurityPkg.dec
 #  Provides security features that conform to TCG/UEFI industry standards
 #
 #  The security features include secure boot, measured boot and user identification.
 #  It also provides the definitions(including PPIs/PROTOCOLs/GUIDs and library classes)
 #  and libraries instances, which are used for those features.
 #
 # Copyright (c) 2009 - 2015, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
 # This program and the accompanying materials are licensed and made available under
 # the terms and conditions of the BSD License which accompanies this distribution.
 # The full text of the license may be found at
 # http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
 #
 # THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
 # WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
 #
 ##

 [Defines]
   DEC_SPECIFICATION              = 0x00010005
   PACKAGE_NAME                   = SecurityPkg
   PACKAGE_UNI_FILE               = SecurityPkg.uni
   PACKAGE_GUID                   = 24369CAC-6AA6-4fb8-88DB-90BF061668AD
   PACKAGE_VERSION                = 0.94

 [Includes]
   Include

 [LibraryClasses]
   ##  @libraryclass  Provides hash interfaces from different implementations.
   #
   HashLib|Include/Library/HashLib.h

   ##  @libraryclass  Provides a platform specific interface to detect physically present user.
   #
   PlatformSecureLib|Include/Library/PlatformSecureLib.h

   ##  @libraryclass  Provides interfaces to handle TPM 1.2 request.
   #
   TcgPhysicalPresenceLib|Include/Library/TcgPhysicalPresenceLib.h

   ##  @libraryclass  Provides support for TCG PP >= 128 Vendor Specific PPI Operation.
   #
   TcgPpVendorLib|Include/Library/TcgPpVendorLib.h

   ##  @libraryclass  Provides interfaces for other modules to send TPM 2.0 command.
   #
   Tpm2CommandLib|Include/Library/Tpm2CommandLib.h

   ##  @libraryclass  Provides interfaces on how to access TPM 2.0 hardware device.
   #
   Tpm2DeviceLib|Include/Library/Tpm2DeviceLib.h

   ##  @libraryclass  Provides interfaces for other modules to send TPM 1.2 command.
   #
   Tpm12CommandLib|Include/Library/Tpm12CommandLib.h

   ##  @libraryclass  Provides interfaces on how to access TPM 1.2 hardware device.
   #
   Tpm12DeviceLib|Include/Library/Tpm12DeviceLib.h

   ##  @libraryclass  Provides TPM Interface Specification (TIS) interfaces for TPM command.
   #
   TpmCommLib|Include/Library/TpmCommLib.h

   ##  @libraryclass  Provides common interfaces about TPM measurement for other modules.
   #
   TpmMeasurementLib|Include/Library/TpmMeasurementLib.h

   ##  @libraryclass  Provides interfaces to handle TPM 2.0 request.
   #
   TrEEPhysicalPresenceLib|Include/Library/TrEEPhysicalPresenceLib.h

   ##  @libraryclass  Provides support for TrEE PP >= 128 Vendor Specific PPI Operation.
   #
   TrEEPpVendorLib|Include/Library/TrEEPpVendorLib.h

 [Guids]
   ## Security package token space guid.
   # Include/Guid/SecurityPkgTokenSpace.h
   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid      = { 0xd3fb176, 0x9569, 0x4d51, { 0xa3, 0xef, 0x7d, 0x61, 0xc6, 0x4f, 0xea, 0xba }}

   ## Guid acted as the authenticated variable store header's signature, and to specify the variable list entries put in the EFI system table.
   #  Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h
   gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid      = { 0xaaf32c78, 0x947b, 0x439a, { 0xa1, 0x80, 0x2e, 0x14, 0x4e, 0xc3, 0x77, 0x92 } }

   ## GUID used to "SecureBootEnable" variable for the Secure Boot feature enable/disable.
   #  This variable is used for allowing a physically present user to disable Secure Boot via firmware setup without the possession of PKpriv.
   #  Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h
   gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid    = { 0xf0a30bc7, 0xaf08, 0x4556, { 0x99, 0xc4, 0x0, 0x10, 0x9, 0xc9, 0x3a, 0x44 } }

   ## GUID used to "CustomMode" variable for two Secure Boot modes feature: "Custom" and "Standard".
   #  Standard Secure Boot mode is the default mode as UEFI Spec's description.
   #  Custom Secure Boot mode allows for more flexibility as specified in the following:
   #  Can enroll or delete PK without existing PK's private key.
   #  Can enroll or delete KEK without existing PK's private key.
   #  Can enroll or delete signature from DB/DBX without KEK's private key.
   #  Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h
   gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid           = { 0xc076ec0c, 0x7028, 0x4399, { 0xa0, 0x72, 0x71, 0xee, 0x5c, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x9f } }

   ## GUID used to "VendorKeysNv" variable to record the out of band secure boot keys modification.
   #  This variable is a read-only NV variable that indicates whether someone other than the platform vendor has used a
   #  mechanism not defined by the UEFI Specification to transition the system to setup mode or to update secure boot keys.
   #  Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h
   gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid               = { 0x9073e4e0, 0x60ec, 0x4b6e, { 0x99, 0x3, 0x4c, 0x22, 0x3c, 0x26, 0xf, 0x3c } }

   ## GUID used to "certdb" variable to store the signer's certificates for common variables with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute.
   #  Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h
   gEfiCertDbGuid                     = { 0xd9bee56e, 0x75dc, 0x49d9, { 0xb4, 0xd7, 0xb5, 0x34, 0x21, 0xf, 0x63, 0x7a } }

   ## Hob GUID used to pass a TCG_PCR_EVENT from a TPM PEIM to a TPM DXE Driver.
   #  Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h
   gTcgEventEntryHobGuid              = { 0x2b9ffb52, 0x1b13, 0x416f, { 0xa8, 0x7b, 0xbc, 0x93, 0xd, 0xef, 0x92, 0xa8 }}

   ## HOB GUID used to record TPM device error.
   #  Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h
   gTpmErrorHobGuid                   = { 0xef598499, 0xb25e, 0x473a, { 0xbf, 0xaf, 0xe7, 0xe5, 0x7d, 0xce, 0x82, 0xc4 }}

   ## HOB GUID used to pass all PEI measured FV info to DXE Driver.
   #  Include/Guid/MeasuredFvHob.h
   gMeasuredFvHobGuid                 = { 0xb2360b42, 0x7173, 0x420a, { 0x86, 0x96, 0x46, 0xca, 0x6b, 0xab, 0x10, 0x60 }}

   ## GUID used to "PhysicalPresence" variable and "PhysicalPresenceFlags" variable for TPM request and response.
   #  Include/Guid/PhysicalPresenceData.h
   gEfiPhysicalPresenceGuid           = { 0xf6499b1, 0xe9ad, 0x493d, { 0xb9, 0xc2, 0x2f, 0x90, 0x81, 0x5c, 0x6c, 0xbc }}

   ## GUID used for form browser, password credential and provider identifier.
   # Include/Guid/PwdCredentialProviderHii.h
   gPwdCredentialProviderGuid         = { 0x78b9ec8b, 0xc000, 0x46c5, { 0xac, 0x93, 0x24, 0xa0, 0xc1, 0xbb, 0x0, 0xce }}

   ## GUID used for form browser, USB credential and provider identifier.
   #  Include/Guid/UsbCredentialProviderHii.h
   gUsbCredentialProviderGuid         = { 0xd0849ed1, 0xa88c, 0x4ba6, { 0xb1, 0xd6, 0xab, 0x50, 0xe2, 0x80, 0xb7, 0xa9 }}

   ## GUID used for FormSet guid and user profile variable.
   # Include/Guid/UserIdentifyManagerHii.h
   gUserIdentifyManagerGuid           = { 0x3ccd3dd8, 0x8d45, 0x4fed, { 0x96, 0x2d, 0x2b, 0x38, 0xcd, 0x82, 0xb3, 0xc4 }}

   ## GUID used for FormSet.
   #  Include/Guid/UserProfileManagerHii.h
   gUserProfileManagerGuid            = { 0xc35f272c, 0x97c2, 0x465a, { 0xa2, 0x16, 0x69, 0x6b, 0x66, 0x8a, 0x8c, 0xfe }}

   ## GUID used for FormSet.
   #  Include/Guid/TcgConfigHii.h
   gTcgConfigFormSetGuid              = { 0xb0f901e4, 0xc424, 0x45de, { 0x90, 0x81, 0x95, 0xe2, 0xb, 0xde, 0x6f, 0xb5 }}

   ## GUID used for FormSet.
   #  Include/Guid/SecureBootConfigHii.h
   gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid       = { 0x5daf50a5, 0xea81, 0x4de2, {0x8f, 0x9b, 0xca, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0xcf, 0x5c, 0x14}}

   ## GUID used to "TrEEPhysicalPresence" variable and "TrEEPhysicalPresenceFlags" variable for TPM2 request and response.
   #  Include/Guid/TrEEPhysicalPresenceData.h
   gEfiTrEEPhysicalPresenceGuid = { 0xf24643c2, 0xc622, 0x494e, { 0x8a, 0xd, 0x46, 0x32, 0x57, 0x9c, 0x2d, 0x5b }}

   ## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate TPM is disabled.
   #  Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h
   gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceNoneGuid      = { 0x00000000, 0x0000, 0x0000, { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } }

   ## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate TPM 1.2 device is selected to support.
   #  Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h
   gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm12Guid     = { 0x8b01e5b6, 0x4f19, 0x46e8, { 0xab, 0x93, 0x1c, 0x53, 0x67, 0x1b, 0x90, 0xcc } }

   ## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate discrete TPM 2.0 device is selected to support.
   #  Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h
   gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm20DtpmGuid = { 0x286bf25a, 0xc2c3, 0x408c, { 0xb3, 0xb4, 0x25, 0xe6, 0x75, 0x8b, 0x73, 0x17 } }

   ## GUID used to select supported TPM instance from UI.
   #  Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h
   gEfiTpmDeviceSelectedGuid          = { 0x7f4158d3, 0x74d, 0x456d, { 0x8c, 0xb2, 0x1, 0xf9, 0xc8, 0xf7, 0x9d, 0xaa } }

   ## GUID used for FormSet and config variable.
   #  Include/Guid/TrEEConfigHii.h
   gTrEEConfigFormSetGuid              = {0xc54b425f, 0xaa79, 0x48b4, { 0x98, 0x1f, 0x99, 0x8b, 0x3c, 0x4b, 0x64, 0x1c }}

 [Ppis]
   ## The PPI GUID for that TPM physical presence should be locked.
   # Include/Ppi/LockPhysicalPresence.h
   gPeiLockPhysicalPresencePpiGuid    = { 0xef9aefe5, 0x2bd3, 0x4031, { 0xaf, 0x7d, 0x5e, 0xfe, 0x5a, 0xbb, 0x9a, 0xd } }

   ## The PPI GUID for that TPM is initialized.
   # Include/Ppi/TpmInitialized.h
   gPeiTpmInitializedPpiGuid      = { 0xe9db0d58, 0xd48d, 0x47f6, { 0x9c, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x40, 0xe8, 0x6c, 0x7b, 0x41 }}

   ## The PPI GUID for that TPM initialization is done. TPM initialization may be success or fail.
   # Include/Ppi/TpmInitialized.h
   gPeiTpmInitializationDonePpiGuid = { 0xa030d115, 0x54dd, 0x447b, { 0x90, 0x64, 0xf2, 0x6, 0x88, 0x3d, 0x7c, 0xcc }}

   ## Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoMeasurementExcluded.h
   gEfiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoMeasurementExcludedPpiGuid = { 0x6e056ff9, 0xc695, 0x4364, { 0x9e, 0x2c, 0x61, 0x26, 0xf5, 0xce, 0xea, 0xae } }

 #
 # [Error.gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid]
 #   0x80000001 | Invalid value provided.
 #   0x80000002 | Reserved bits must be set to zero.
 #

 [PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule]
   ## Image verification policy for OptionRom. Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>
   #  NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>
   #  0x00000000      Always trust the image.<BR>
   #  0x00000001      Never trust the image.<BR>
   #  0x00000002      Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>
   #  0x00000003      Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>
   #  0x00000004      Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>
   #  0x00000005      Query user when there is security violation.<BR>
   # @Prompt Set policy for the image from OptionRom.
   # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005
   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000001

   ## Image verification policy for removable media which includes CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.
   #  Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>
   #  NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>
   #  0x00000000      Always trust the image.<BR>
   #  0x00000001      Never trust the image.<BR>
   #  0x00000002      Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>
   #  0x00000003      Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>
   #  0x00000004      Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>
   #  0x00000005      Query user when there is security violation.<BR>
   # @Prompt Set policy for the image from removable media.
   # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005
   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000002

   ## Image verification policy for fixed media which includes hard disk.
   #  Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>
   #  NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>
   #  0x00000000      Always trust the image.<BR>
   #  0x00000001      Never trust the image.<BR>
   #  0x00000002      Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>
   #  0x00000003      Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>
   #  0x00000004      Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>
   #  0x00000005      Query user when there is security violation.<BR>
   # @Prompt Set policy for the image from fixed media.
   # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005
   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000003

   ## Defer Image Load policy settings. The policy is bitwise.
   #  If a bit is set, the image from corresponding device will be trusted when loading. Or
   #  the image will be deferred. The deferred image will be checked after user is identified.<BR><BR>
   #    BIT0       - Image from unknown device. <BR>
   #    BIT1       - Image from firmware volume.<BR>
   #    BIT2       - Image from OptionRom.<BR>
   #    BIT3       - Image from removable media which includes CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.<BR>
   #    BIT4       - Image from fixed media device which includes hard disk.<BR>
   # @Prompt Set policy whether trust image before user identification.
   # @ValidRange 0x80000002 | 0x00000000 - 0x0000001F
   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDeferImageLoadPolicy|0x0000001F|UINT32|0x0000004

   ## Null-terminated Unicode string of the file name that is the default name to save USB credential.
   #  The specified file should be saved at the root directory of USB storage disk.
   # @Prompt File name to save credential.
   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedUsbCredentialProviderTokenFileName|L"Token.bin"|VOID*|0x00000005

   ## The size of Append variable buffer. This buffer is reserved for runtime use, OS can append data into one existing variable.
   #  Note: This PCD is not been used.
   # @Prompt Max variable size for append operation.
   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMaxAppendVariableSize|0x2000|UINT32|0x30000005

   ## Specifies the type of TCG platform that contains TPM chip.<BR><BR>
   #  If 0, TCG platform type is PC client.<BR>
   #  If 1, TCG platform type is PC server.<BR>
   # @Prompt Select platform type.
   # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1
   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPlatformClass|0|UINT8|0x00000006

   ## Progress Code for TPM device subclass definitions.<BR><BR>
   #  EFI_PERIPHERAL_TPM  = (EFI_PERIPHERAL | 0x000D0000) = 0x010D0000<BR>
   # @Prompt Status Code for TPM device definitions
   # @ValidList  0x80000003 | 0x010D0000
   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdStatusCodeSubClassTpmDevice|0x010D0000|UINT32|0x00000007

 [PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
   ## Indicates the presence or absence of the platform operator during firmware booting.
   #  If platform operator is not physical presence during boot. TPM will be locked and the TPM commands
   #  that required operator physical presence can not run.<BR><BR>
   #   TRUE  - The platform operator is physically present.<BR>
   #   FALSE - The platform operator is not physically present.<BR>
   # @Prompt Physical presence of the platform operator.
   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPhysicalPresence|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010001

 [PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
   ## Indicates whether TPM physical presence is locked during platform initialization.
   #  Once it is locked, it can not be unlocked for TPM life time.<BR><BR>
   #   TRUE  - Lock TPM physical presence asserting method.<BR>
   #   FALSE - Not lock TPM physical presence asserting method.<BR>
   # @Prompt Lock TPM physical presence asserting method.
   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceLifetimeLock|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010003

 [PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
   ## Indicates whether the platform supports the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR><BR>
   #   TRUE  - Supports the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR>
   #   FALSE - Does not support the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR>
   # @Prompt Enable software method of asserting physical presence.
   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceCmdEnable|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010004

 [PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
   ## Indicates whether the platform supports the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR><BR>
   #   TRUE  - Supports the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR>
   #   FALSE - Does not support the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR>
   # @Prompt Enable hardware method of asserting physical presence.
   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceHwEnable|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010005

 [PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
   ## This PCD indicates if debugger exists. <BR><BR>
   #   TRUE  - Firmware debugger exists.<BR>
   #   FALSE - Firmware debugger doesn't exist.<BR>
   # @Prompt Firmware debugger status.
   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFirmwareDebuggerInitialized|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010009

   ## This PCD indicates the initialization policy for TPM 2.0.<BR><BR>
   #  If 0, no initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.<BR>
   #  If 1, initialization needed.<BR>
   # @Prompt TPM 2.0 device initialization policy.<BR>
   # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1
   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2InitializationPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000A

   ## This PCD indicates the initialization policy for TPM 1.2.<BR><BR>
   #  If 0, no initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.<BR>
   #  If 1, initialization needed.<BR>
   # @Prompt TPM 1.2 device initialization policy.
   # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1
   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInitializationPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000B

   ## This PCD indicates the TPM 2.0 SelfTest policy.<BR><BR>
   #  if 0, no SelfTest needed - most likely used for fTPM, because it might already be tested.<BR>
   #  if 1, SelfTest needed.<BR>
   # @Prompt TPM 2.0 device selftest.
   # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1
   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2SelfTestPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000C

   ## This PCD indicates Static Core Root of Trust for Measurement (SCRTM) policy using TPM 2.0.<BR><BR>
   #  if 0, no SCRTM measurement needed - In this case, it is already done.<BR>
   #  if 1, SCRTM measurement done by BIOS.<BR>
   # @Prompt SCRTM policy setting for TPM 2.0 device.
   # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1
   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2ScrtmPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000D

   ## This PCD indicates Static Core Root of Trust for Measurement (SCRTM) policy using TPM 1.2.<BR><BR>
   #  if 0, no SCRTM measurement needed - In this case, it is already done.<BR>
   #  if 1, SCRTM measurement done by BIOS.<BR>
   # @Prompt SCRTM policy setting for TPM 1.2 device
   # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1
   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmScrtmPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000E

   ## Guid name to identify TPM instance.<BR><BR>
   #  TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_NONE means disable.<BR>
   #  TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_TPM12 means TPM 1.2 DTPM.<BR>
   #  TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_DTPM2 means TPM 2.0 DTPM.<BR>
   # @Prompt TPM device type identifier
   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInstanceGuid |{ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }|VOID*|0x0001000F

   ## This PCD indicates Hash mask for TPM 2.0.<BR><BR>
   #  If this bit is set, that means this algorithm is needed to extend to PCR.<BR>
   #  If this bit is clear, that means this algorithm is NOT needed to extend to PCR.<BR>
   #    BIT0  -  SHA1.<BR>
   #    BIT1  -  SHA256.<BR>
   #    BIT2  -  SHA384.<BR>
   #    BIT3  -  SHA512.<BR>
   # @Prompt Hash mask for TPM 2.0
   # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x0000000F
   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2HashMask|0x0000000F|UINT32|0x00010010

   ## This PCD indicates if BIOS auto detect TPM1.2 or dTPM2.0.<BR><BR>
   #  FALSE - No auto detection.<BR>
   #  TRUE  - Auto detection.<BR>
   # @Prompt TPM type detection.
   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmAutoDetection|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010011

   ## This PCD indicates TPM base address.<BR><BR>
   # @Prompt TPM device address.
   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmBaseAddress|0xFED40000|UINT64|0x00010012

   ## Provides one or more SHA 256 Hashes of the RSA 2048 public keys used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images
   #
   # @Prompt One or more SHA 256 Hashes of RSA 2048 bit public keys used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images
   #
   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRsa2048Sha256PublicKeyBuffer|{0x91, 0x29, 0xc4, 0xbd, 0xea, 0x6d, 0xda, 0xb3, 0xaa, 0x6f, 0x50, 0x16, 0xfc, 0xdb, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x3c, 0xd6, 0xdc, 0xa4, 0x7a, 0x0e, 0xdd, 0xe6, 0x15, 0x8c, 0x73, 0x96, 0xa2, 0xd4, 0xa6, 0x4d}|VOID*|0x00010013

 [UserExtensions.TianoCore."ExtraFiles"]
   SecurityPkgExtra.uni
	## @file SecurityPkg.dec
	# Provides security features that conform to TCG/UEFI industry standards
	#
	# The security features include secure boot, measured boot and user identification.
	# It also provides the definitions(including PPIs/PROTOCOLs/GUIDs and library classes)
	# and libraries instances, which are used for those features.
	#
	# Copyright (c) 2009 - 2015, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
	# This program and the accompanying materials are licensed and made available under
	# the terms and conditions of the BSD License which accompanies this distribution.
	# The full text of the license may be found at
	# http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
	#
	# THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
	# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
	#
	##

	[Defines]
	DEC_SPECIFICATION = 0x00010005
	PACKAGE_NAME = SecurityPkg
	PACKAGE_UNI_FILE = SecurityPkg.uni
	PACKAGE_GUID = 24369CAC-6AA6-4fb8-88DB-90BF061668AD
	PACKAGE_VERSION = 0.94

	[Includes]
	Include

	[LibraryClasses]
	## @libraryclass Provides hash interfaces from different implementations.
	#
	HashLib\|Include/Library/HashLib.h

	## @libraryclass Provides a platform specific interface to detect physically present user.
	#
	PlatformSecureLib\|Include/Library/PlatformSecureLib.h

	## @libraryclass Provides interfaces to handle TPM 1.2 request.
	#
	TcgPhysicalPresenceLib\|Include/Library/TcgPhysicalPresenceLib.h

	## @libraryclass Provides support for TCG PP >= 128 Vendor Specific PPI Operation.
	#
	TcgPpVendorLib\|Include/Library/TcgPpVendorLib.h

	## @libraryclass Provides interfaces for other modules to send TPM 2.0 command.
	#
	Tpm2CommandLib\|Include/Library/Tpm2CommandLib.h

	## @libraryclass Provides interfaces on how to access TPM 2.0 hardware device.
	#
	Tpm2DeviceLib\|Include/Library/Tpm2DeviceLib.h

	## @libraryclass Provides interfaces for other modules to send TPM 1.2 command.
	#
	Tpm12CommandLib\|Include/Library/Tpm12CommandLib.h

	## @libraryclass Provides interfaces on how to access TPM 1.2 hardware device.
	#
	Tpm12DeviceLib\|Include/Library/Tpm12DeviceLib.h

	## @libraryclass Provides TPM Interface Specification (TIS) interfaces for TPM command.
	#
	TpmCommLib\|Include/Library/TpmCommLib.h

	## @libraryclass Provides common interfaces about TPM measurement for other modules.
	#
	TpmMeasurementLib\|Include/Library/TpmMeasurementLib.h

	## @libraryclass Provides interfaces to handle TPM 2.0 request.
	#
	TrEEPhysicalPresenceLib\|Include/Library/TrEEPhysicalPresenceLib.h

	## @libraryclass Provides support for TrEE PP >= 128 Vendor Specific PPI Operation.
	#
	TrEEPpVendorLib\|Include/Library/TrEEPpVendorLib.h

	[Guids]
	## Security package token space guid.
	# Include/Guid/SecurityPkgTokenSpace.h
	gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid = { 0xd3fb176, 0x9569, 0x4d51, { 0xa3, 0xef, 0x7d, 0x61, 0xc6, 0x4f, 0xea, 0xba }}

	## Guid acted as the authenticated variable store header's signature, and to specify the variable list entries put in the EFI system table.
	# Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h
	gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid = { 0xaaf32c78, 0x947b, 0x439a, { 0xa1, 0x80, 0x2e, 0x14, 0x4e, 0xc3, 0x77, 0x92 } }

	## GUID used to "SecureBootEnable" variable for the Secure Boot feature enable/disable.
	# This variable is used for allowing a physically present user to disable Secure Boot via firmware setup without the possession of PKpriv.
	# Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h
	gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid = { 0xf0a30bc7, 0xaf08, 0x4556, { 0x99, 0xc4, 0x0, 0x10, 0x9, 0xc9, 0x3a, 0x44 } }

	## GUID used to "CustomMode" variable for two Secure Boot modes feature: "Custom" and "Standard".
	# Standard Secure Boot mode is the default mode as UEFI Spec's description.
	# Custom Secure Boot mode allows for more flexibility as specified in the following:
	# Can enroll or delete PK without existing PK's private key.
	# Can enroll or delete KEK without existing PK's private key.
	# Can enroll or delete signature from DB/DBX without KEK's private key.
	# Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h
	gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid = { 0xc076ec0c, 0x7028, 0x4399, { 0xa0, 0x72, 0x71, 0xee, 0x5c, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x9f } }

	## GUID used to "VendorKeysNv" variable to record the out of band secure boot keys modification.
	# This variable is a read-only NV variable that indicates whether someone other than the platform vendor has used a
	# mechanism not defined by the UEFI Specification to transition the system to setup mode or to update secure boot keys.
	# Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h
	gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid = { 0x9073e4e0, 0x60ec, 0x4b6e, { 0x99, 0x3, 0x4c, 0x22, 0x3c, 0x26, 0xf, 0x3c } }

	## GUID used to "certdb" variable to store the signer's certificates for common variables with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute.
	# Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h
	gEfiCertDbGuid = { 0xd9bee56e, 0x75dc, 0x49d9, { 0xb4, 0xd7, 0xb5, 0x34, 0x21, 0xf, 0x63, 0x7a } }

	## Hob GUID used to pass a TCG_PCR_EVENT from a TPM PEIM to a TPM DXE Driver.
	# Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h
	gTcgEventEntryHobGuid = { 0x2b9ffb52, 0x1b13, 0x416f, { 0xa8, 0x7b, 0xbc, 0x93, 0xd, 0xef, 0x92, 0xa8 }}

	## HOB GUID used to record TPM device error.
	# Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h
	gTpmErrorHobGuid = { 0xef598499, 0xb25e, 0x473a, { 0xbf, 0xaf, 0xe7, 0xe5, 0x7d, 0xce, 0x82, 0xc4 }}

	## HOB GUID used to pass all PEI measured FV info to DXE Driver.
	# Include/Guid/MeasuredFvHob.h
	gMeasuredFvHobGuid = { 0xb2360b42, 0x7173, 0x420a, { 0x86, 0x96, 0x46, 0xca, 0x6b, 0xab, 0x10, 0x60 }}

	## GUID used to "PhysicalPresence" variable and "PhysicalPresenceFlags" variable for TPM request and response.
	# Include/Guid/PhysicalPresenceData.h
	gEfiPhysicalPresenceGuid = { 0xf6499b1, 0xe9ad, 0x493d, { 0xb9, 0xc2, 0x2f, 0x90, 0x81, 0x5c, 0x6c, 0xbc }}

	## GUID used for form browser, password credential and provider identifier.
	# Include/Guid/PwdCredentialProviderHii.h
	gPwdCredentialProviderGuid = { 0x78b9ec8b, 0xc000, 0x46c5, { 0xac, 0x93, 0x24, 0xa0, 0xc1, 0xbb, 0x0, 0xce }}

	## GUID used for form browser, USB credential and provider identifier.
	# Include/Guid/UsbCredentialProviderHii.h
	gUsbCredentialProviderGuid = { 0xd0849ed1, 0xa88c, 0x4ba6, { 0xb1, 0xd6, 0xab, 0x50, 0xe2, 0x80, 0xb7, 0xa9 }}

	## GUID used for FormSet guid and user profile variable.
	# Include/Guid/UserIdentifyManagerHii.h
	gUserIdentifyManagerGuid = { 0x3ccd3dd8, 0x8d45, 0x4fed, { 0x96, 0x2d, 0x2b, 0x38, 0xcd, 0x82, 0xb3, 0xc4 }}

	## GUID used for FormSet.
	# Include/Guid/UserProfileManagerHii.h
	gUserProfileManagerGuid = { 0xc35f272c, 0x97c2, 0x465a, { 0xa2, 0x16, 0x69, 0x6b, 0x66, 0x8a, 0x8c, 0xfe }}

	## GUID used for FormSet.
	# Include/Guid/TcgConfigHii.h
	gTcgConfigFormSetGuid = { 0xb0f901e4, 0xc424, 0x45de, { 0x90, 0x81, 0x95, 0xe2, 0xb, 0xde, 0x6f, 0xb5 }}

	## GUID used for FormSet.
	# Include/Guid/SecureBootConfigHii.h
	gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid = { 0x5daf50a5, 0xea81, 0x4de2, {0x8f, 0x9b, 0xca, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0xcf, 0x5c, 0x14}}

	## GUID used to "TrEEPhysicalPresence" variable and "TrEEPhysicalPresenceFlags" variable for TPM2 request and response.
	# Include/Guid/TrEEPhysicalPresenceData.h
	gEfiTrEEPhysicalPresenceGuid = { 0xf24643c2, 0xc622, 0x494e, { 0x8a, 0xd, 0x46, 0x32, 0x57, 0x9c, 0x2d, 0x5b }}

	## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate TPM is disabled.
	# Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h
	gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceNoneGuid = { 0x00000000, 0x0000, 0x0000, { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } }

	## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate TPM 1.2 device is selected to support.
	# Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h
	gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm12Guid = { 0x8b01e5b6, 0x4f19, 0x46e8, { 0xab, 0x93, 0x1c, 0x53, 0x67, 0x1b, 0x90, 0xcc } }

	## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate discrete TPM 2.0 device is selected to support.
	# Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h
	gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm20DtpmGuid = { 0x286bf25a, 0xc2c3, 0x408c, { 0xb3, 0xb4, 0x25, 0xe6, 0x75, 0x8b, 0x73, 0x17 } }

	## GUID used to select supported TPM instance from UI.
	# Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h
	gEfiTpmDeviceSelectedGuid = { 0x7f4158d3, 0x74d, 0x456d, { 0x8c, 0xb2, 0x1, 0xf9, 0xc8, 0xf7, 0x9d, 0xaa } }

	## GUID used for FormSet and config variable.
	# Include/Guid/TrEEConfigHii.h
	gTrEEConfigFormSetGuid = {0xc54b425f, 0xaa79, 0x48b4, { 0x98, 0x1f, 0x99, 0x8b, 0x3c, 0x4b, 0x64, 0x1c }}

	[Ppis]
	## The PPI GUID for that TPM physical presence should be locked.
	# Include/Ppi/LockPhysicalPresence.h
	gPeiLockPhysicalPresencePpiGuid = { 0xef9aefe5, 0x2bd3, 0x4031, { 0xaf, 0x7d, 0x5e, 0xfe, 0x5a, 0xbb, 0x9a, 0xd } }

	## The PPI GUID for that TPM is initialized.
	# Include/Ppi/TpmInitialized.h
	gPeiTpmInitializedPpiGuid = { 0xe9db0d58, 0xd48d, 0x47f6, { 0x9c, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x40, 0xe8, 0x6c, 0x7b, 0x41 }}

	## The PPI GUID for that TPM initialization is done. TPM initialization may be success or fail.
	# Include/Ppi/TpmInitialized.h
	gPeiTpmInitializationDonePpiGuid = { 0xa030d115, 0x54dd, 0x447b, { 0x90, 0x64, 0xf2, 0x6, 0x88, 0x3d, 0x7c, 0xcc }}

	## Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoMeasurementExcluded.h
	gEfiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoMeasurementExcludedPpiGuid = { 0x6e056ff9, 0xc695, 0x4364, { 0x9e, 0x2c, 0x61, 0x26, 0xf5, 0xce, 0xea, 0xae } }

	#
	# [Error.gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid]
	# 0x80000001 \| Invalid value provided.
	# 0x80000002 \| Reserved bits must be set to zero.
	#

	[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule]
	## Image verification policy for OptionRom. Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>
	# NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>
	# 0x00000000 Always trust the image.<BR>
	# 0x00000001 Never trust the image.<BR>
	# 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>
	# 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>
	# 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>
	# 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.<BR>
	# @Prompt Set policy for the image from OptionRom.
	# @ValidRange 0x80000001 \| 0x00000000 - 0x00000005
	gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy\|0x04\|UINT32\|0x00000001

	## Image verification policy for removable media which includes CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.
	# Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>
	# NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>
	# 0x00000000 Always trust the image.<BR>
	# 0x00000001 Never trust the image.<BR>
	# 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>
	# 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>
	# 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>
	# 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.<BR>
	# @Prompt Set policy for the image from removable media.
	# @ValidRange 0x80000001 \| 0x00000000 - 0x00000005
	gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy\|0x04\|UINT32\|0x00000002

	## Image verification policy for fixed media which includes hard disk.
	# Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>
	# NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>
	# 0x00000000 Always trust the image.<BR>
	# 0x00000001 Never trust the image.<BR>
	# 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>
	# 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>
	# 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>
	# 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.<BR>
	# @Prompt Set policy for the image from fixed media.
	# @ValidRange 0x80000001 \| 0x00000000 - 0x00000005
	gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy\|0x04\|UINT32\|0x00000003

	## Defer Image Load policy settings. The policy is bitwise.
	# If a bit is set, the image from corresponding device will be trusted when loading. Or
	# the image will be deferred. The deferred image will be checked after user is identified.<BR><BR>
	# BIT0 - Image from unknown device. <BR>
	# BIT1 - Image from firmware volume.<BR>
	# BIT2 - Image from OptionRom.<BR>
	# BIT3 - Image from removable media which includes CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.<BR>
	# BIT4 - Image from fixed media device which includes hard disk.<BR>
	# @Prompt Set policy whether trust image before user identification.
	# @ValidRange 0x80000002 \| 0x00000000 - 0x0000001F
	gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDeferImageLoadPolicy\|0x0000001F\|UINT32\|0x0000004

	## Null-terminated Unicode string of the file name that is the default name to save USB credential.
	# The specified file should be saved at the root directory of USB storage disk.
	# @Prompt File name to save credential.
	gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedUsbCredentialProviderTokenFileName\|L"Token.bin"\|VOID*\|0x00000005

	## The size of Append variable buffer. This buffer is reserved for runtime use, OS can append data into one existing variable.
	# Note: This PCD is not been used.
	# @Prompt Max variable size for append operation.
	gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMaxAppendVariableSize\|0x2000\|UINT32\|0x30000005

	## Specifies the type of TCG platform that contains TPM chip.<BR><BR>
	# If 0, TCG platform type is PC client.<BR>
	# If 1, TCG platform type is PC server.<BR>
	# @Prompt Select platform type.
	# @ValidRange 0x80000001 \| 0x00 - 0x1
	gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPlatformClass\|0\|UINT8\|0x00000006

	## Progress Code for TPM device subclass definitions.<BR><BR>
	# EFI_PERIPHERAL_TPM = (EFI_PERIPHERAL \| 0x000D0000) = 0x010D0000<BR>
	# @Prompt Status Code for TPM device definitions
	# @ValidList 0x80000003 \| 0x010D0000
	gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdStatusCodeSubClassTpmDevice\|0x010D0000\|UINT32\|0x00000007

	[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
	## Indicates the presence or absence of the platform operator during firmware booting.
	# If platform operator is not physical presence during boot. TPM will be locked and the TPM commands
	# that required operator physical presence can not run.<BR><BR>
	# TRUE - The platform operator is physically present.<BR>
	# FALSE - The platform operator is not physically present.<BR>
	# @Prompt Physical presence of the platform operator.
	gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPhysicalPresence\|TRUE\|BOOLEAN\|0x00010001

	[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
	## Indicates whether TPM physical presence is locked during platform initialization.
	# Once it is locked, it can not be unlocked for TPM life time.<BR><BR>
	# TRUE - Lock TPM physical presence asserting method.<BR>
	# FALSE - Not lock TPM physical presence asserting method.<BR>
	# @Prompt Lock TPM physical presence asserting method.
	gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceLifetimeLock\|FALSE\|BOOLEAN\|0x00010003

	[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
	## Indicates whether the platform supports the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR><BR>
	# TRUE - Supports the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR>
	# FALSE - Does not support the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR>
	# @Prompt Enable software method of asserting physical presence.
	gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceCmdEnable\|TRUE\|BOOLEAN\|0x00010004

	[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
	## Indicates whether the platform supports the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR><BR>
	# TRUE - Supports the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR>
	# FALSE - Does not support the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR>
	# @Prompt Enable hardware method of asserting physical presence.
	gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceHwEnable\|TRUE\|BOOLEAN\|0x00010005

	[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
	## This PCD indicates if debugger exists. <BR><BR>
	# TRUE - Firmware debugger exists.<BR>
	# FALSE - Firmware debugger doesn't exist.<BR>
	# @Prompt Firmware debugger status.
	gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFirmwareDebuggerInitialized\|FALSE\|BOOLEAN\|0x00010009

	## This PCD indicates the initialization policy for TPM 2.0.<BR><BR>
	# If 0, no initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.<BR>
	# If 1, initialization needed.<BR>
	# @Prompt TPM 2.0 device initialization policy.<BR>
	# @ValidRange 0x80000001 \| 0x00 - 0x1
	gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2InitializationPolicy\|1\|UINT8\|0x0001000A

	## This PCD indicates the initialization policy for TPM 1.2.<BR><BR>
	# If 0, no initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.<BR>
	# If 1, initialization needed.<BR>
	# @Prompt TPM 1.2 device initialization policy.
	# @ValidRange 0x80000001 \| 0x00 - 0x1
	gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInitializationPolicy\|1\|UINT8\|0x0001000B

	## This PCD indicates the TPM 2.0 SelfTest policy.<BR><BR>
	# if 0, no SelfTest needed - most likely used for fTPM, because it might already be tested.<BR>
	# if 1, SelfTest needed.<BR>
	# @Prompt TPM 2.0 device selftest.
	# @ValidRange 0x80000001 \| 0x00 - 0x1
	gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2SelfTestPolicy\|1\|UINT8\|0x0001000C

	## This PCD indicates Static Core Root of Trust for Measurement (SCRTM) policy using TPM 2.0.<BR><BR>
	# if 0, no SCRTM measurement needed - In this case, it is already done.<BR>
	# if 1, SCRTM measurement done by BIOS.<BR>
	# @Prompt SCRTM policy setting for TPM 2.0 device.
	# @ValidRange 0x80000001 \| 0x00 - 0x1
	gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2ScrtmPolicy\|1\|UINT8\|0x0001000D

	## This PCD indicates Static Core Root of Trust for Measurement (SCRTM) policy using TPM 1.2.<BR><BR>
	# if 0, no SCRTM measurement needed - In this case, it is already done.<BR>
	# if 1, SCRTM measurement done by BIOS.<BR>
	# @Prompt SCRTM policy setting for TPM 1.2 device
	# @ValidRange 0x80000001 \| 0x00 - 0x1
	gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmScrtmPolicy\|1\|UINT8\|0x0001000E

	## Guid name to identify TPM instance.<BR><BR>
	# TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_NONE means disable.<BR>
	# TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_TPM12 means TPM 1.2 DTPM.<BR>
	# TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_DTPM2 means TPM 2.0 DTPM.<BR>
	# @Prompt TPM device type identifier
	gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInstanceGuid \|{ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }\|VOID*\|0x0001000F

	## This PCD indicates Hash mask for TPM 2.0.<BR><BR>
	# If this bit is set, that means this algorithm is needed to extend to PCR.<BR>
	# If this bit is clear, that means this algorithm is NOT needed to extend to PCR.<BR>
	# BIT0 - SHA1.<BR>
	# BIT1 - SHA256.<BR>
	# BIT2 - SHA384.<BR>
	# BIT3 - SHA512.<BR>
	# @Prompt Hash mask for TPM 2.0
	# @ValidRange 0x80000001 \| 0x00000000 - 0x0000000F
	gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2HashMask\|0x0000000F\|UINT32\|0x00010010

	## This PCD indicates if BIOS auto detect TPM1.2 or dTPM2.0.<BR><BR>
	# FALSE - No auto detection.<BR>
	# TRUE - Auto detection.<BR>
	# @Prompt TPM type detection.
	gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmAutoDetection\|TRUE\|BOOLEAN\|0x00010011

	## This PCD indicates TPM base address.<BR><BR>
	# @Prompt TPM device address.
	gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmBaseAddress\|0xFED40000\|UINT64\|0x00010012

	## Provides one or more SHA 256 Hashes of the RSA 2048 public keys used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images
	#
	# @Prompt One or more SHA 256 Hashes of RSA 2048 bit public keys used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images
	#
	gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRsa2048Sha256PublicKeyBuffer\|{0x91, 0x29, 0xc4, 0xbd, 0xea, 0x6d, 0xda, 0xb3, 0xaa, 0x6f, 0x50, 0x16, 0xfc, 0xdb, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x3c, 0xd6, 0xdc, 0xa4, 0x7a, 0x0e, 0xdd, 0xe6, 0x15, 0x8c, 0x73, 0x96, 0xa2, 0xd4, 0xa6, 0x4d}\|VOID*\|0x00010013

	[UserExtensions.TianoCore."ExtraFiles"]
	SecurityPkgExtra.uni